A HIBE scheme with independent delegation are free from Key Escrow Problem that is inherent in HIBE, given the root PKG is unconditionally trusted. We propose a new technique -Identifier Discrimination for composing private keys for entities in hierarchy. With the technique, we construct a HIBE scheme under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Helleman (DBDH) assumption in standard model with independent delegation, in which the privilege of generating private keys for each individual entity is delegated by the root PKG to any of its ancestors through authorization, that we call Authorization Delegation. Moreover, basing on Naor transformation of an identity-based signature (IBS) out of an IBE, we build a new hierarchical IBS (HIBS) scheme from our HIBE scheme. Being unable to generate a private key for any of its descendants, an entity cannot sign messages on behalf of any of its descendants, which guarantees that authenticity and non-repudiation properties are achieved in HIBS setting.
Introduction
Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) [6, 8, 10] is a generalization of IBE [6] that maps institution structure or entity relationship in real world. Gentry and Silverberg [8] presented the first HIBE construction in the random oracle model. Boneh and Boyen [2, 4] introduced a selective identity, chosen-plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure HIBE scheme 1 
BB
under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in standard model. Later, works by Boneh et al. [5] , Waters [13] and Lewko et al. [11] provided some fully secure schemes without random oracles. Since the introduction of constructing practical identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes from bilinear pairings, it has been almost one and a half decades; however, how to construct hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes with independent delegation is still open, which characterizes that any entity is incapable of deriving private keys for its descendants with direct use of its private key, and the private key generator (PKG) can authorize every entity to be able to derive private keys for its descendants with independent authorization per descendant.
As noted by Naor [6] , IBS [9, 12] can be steadily constructed from IBE by treating the message intended to be signed as child identifier of signer's identity and extracting a private key for the newly constructed identity as resulting signature [1, 3, 7] . Hierarchical IBS is natural generalization of IBS from HIBE [8] .
Related Work
Although key escrow problem is inherent in Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) resulting from the mechanism of generating private keys for entities in the system, but it is necessary not to let the problem be exaggerated in HIBC. However, as of BB 1 system proposed by Boneh and Boyen [4] , any entity can derive private keys for all of its descendants. That we call unlimited delegation, which undesirably empowers an entity to be able to act on behalf of any of its descendants.
As for HIBE systems in [5] and [11] , an entity in the system is restricted to be only capable of generating private keys for its descendants of limited depth. Let , (
values for deriving private keys for all of its descendants. Actually, by distributing a restricted private key for j ID with only t components
Entity j , Entity j can only generate private keys for its descendants of bounded depth t , i.e., descendants at levels between 1  j and t j  along the hierarchy. That is called limited delegation. Limited delegation does prevent private keys for descendants at depth beyond the limited depth from being derived. Nevertheless, there is no means to only derive a private key for an entity without revealing privates keys for its ancestors. This undesirable breach in privacy is resulted from the need of a parent's private key when deriving a private key for a child.
Our Results
We construct a selective identity secure HIBE system under DBDH assumption in standard model with independent delegation and dedicated encryption privacy, where any entity not being authorized does not have the capability of deriving valid private keys for its descendants, however any entity can be authorized to be capable of generating valid private keys for its descendants. Moreover, basing on Naor transformation of an identity-based signature (IBS) out of an IBE, we build a new hierarchical IBS (HIBS) scheme from our HIBE scheme. Being unable to generating a private key for any of its descendants, an entity cannot sign messages on behalf of any of its descendants, which guarantees that authenticity and non-repudiation properties are achieved in HIBS setting.
Identifier Discrimination. When extracting a private key for identity
of Entity j , our HIBE construction differentiates between the local identifier j I and ancestor identifiers (non-local identifiers) 1 I ,, 1  j I , on which global privacy and dedicated privacy making up of the private key for j ID are defined respectively, and any entity being unable to generate dedicated privacy for any of its descendants is prevented from deriving valid private keys for the descendant. That we call Identifier Discrimination.
Imaginary Identity. The concept of imaginary identity corresponding to a true identity j ID is introduced for defining secrets that are private values for deriving private keys for the identity. A secret is originally crafted by the root PKG by randomizing its master key along an imaginary identity hierarchy constructed from j ID for which private keys are authorized to be derived.
HIBE Construction with Independent Delegation
An HIBE scheme is a 5-tuple of algorithms
. We opt to construct the system in more general asymmetric
. Our construction is applicable to symmetric bilinear pairing also, and can be easily converted by discarding all hats ˆ from the symbols. 
2.1
where 0 g is the origin of the privacy, and  
Correctness
With private key 
That is, our HIBE scheme is consistent.
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Authorized Delegation: Secret Derivation along Imaginary Identity Hierarchy
Our construction does provide a means for the root PKG to authorize an entity to be capable of deriving private keys for any of its descendants through randomization along a virtual identity hierarchy specific to identity of the descendant. Virtual here means that an imaginary identity is constructed from the real identity for which privilege of generating private keys is delegated. Definition 1 An imaginary identity 
Selective-Message HIBS Construction
In this section, we build a selectively secure HIBS scheme against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the standard model from the selective identity secure HIBE construction in Section 2 based on Naor transformation. As of selectively secure signature [4] , the adversary is required to announce the message on which it intends to forge a signature prior to HIBS setting being set by the challenger.
Construction
Our HIBS scheme is a 4-tuple of algorithms ) , , , ( = Verify Sign Extract Setup HIBS  defined as follows. 
To sign a message 
Conclusion
It is rational to viewed the root PKG as a trusted party or being unconditionally trusted, but those level PKGs should be treated suspiciously in hierarchical identity based setting. On the other word, from a security point of view, convention that level PKGs, being able to derive private keys for their descendants, are capable of decrypting or signing on behalf of their descendants is unjustifiable. In order to achieving independent delegation for dealing with key escrow problem in HIBE schemes, Identifier Discrimination technique is proposed and implemented. With the technique, any entity is not capable of deriving private keys for its descendants with direct use of its private key, thus preventing the entity from acting (decrypting, signing and so on) on behalf of its descendants, and key delegation is fullfilled through independent authorization per descendant (authorized delegation).
Different from IBS schemes constructed from HIBE schemes with unlimited delegation (and also limited delegation), where the private key for an identity is the certain signing key for the identity, the HIBS scheme constructed in this paper is logically independent to the HIBE scheme from which it is built, i.e., the signing key is independent to the private key for an identical identity.
